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

John Carter Brown.

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THE
Comparative Importance
OF
OUR ACQUISITIONS
FROM
FRANCE in AMERICA.

WITH

REMARKS on a PAMPHLET,
INTITLED,
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
COMMERCIAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE LATE NEGOTIATION IN 1761.

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JOHN CARTER BROWN.

BROWN

THE following Pamphlet was writ, before the Preliminary Articles of Peace were ſigned, which have ſince been ratified and communicated to Parliament. They are conformable to the main Scope of the Author's Argument, altho' in ſome very important Particulars, they exceed his moſt ſanguine Hopes; and he is happy in finding, that his Eſſay upon what ought to be, is now become, if it hath any Force, a Vindication of Terms actually concluded.

THE
Comparative Importance
OF OUR
Acquiſitions from *France*
IN
AMERICA, &c.

THE Diſtinction between ſpeculative and practical Notions appears to be, that, in the firſt, abſtracted Ideas only are conſidered; diveſted of Circumſtances which in Practice are found inſeparable from them. They compoſe the Knowledge of the Ignorant, dictate the Language of the Unthinking, and form the Conduct of raſh, ſuperficial and ſanguine Men: of all thoſe whoſe Minds are not ſufficient to take in the whole of an Object, whoſe Fancies ſkim along the Surface of Things, or whoſe Paſſions hurry them towards their

Object, without ſuffering them to deſcend into Diſcuſſions, reſerved for the cool and conſiderate Reaſoner.

From theſe Cauſes the Ruin of Individuals, the Deſtruction of Families, and the Deſolation of Countries are derived: and they are equally exemplified in all Ranks and Conditions of Men, from the Conqueror of Nations down to the improvident Spendthrift of a private Fortune.

Abſtracted Ideas of Victory and Conqueſt, drew upon *Lewis* the Fourteenth the Reſentment and Power of all *Europe*; led *Charles* the Twelfth of *Sweden* to Defeat and Diſgrace on the Plains of *Pultowa*; and in this War, after expoſing the King of *Pruſſia* to Diſaſters, from which he could only be extricated by the interpoſition of unhoped for Events, may, during its farther Progreſs, furniſh another Example in the Houſe of *Auſtria*, of the fatal Effects produced by head-long Reſentment and blindfold Ambition. In private Life the Inſtances are innumerable: He who is ſmitten for his Sins (deſcending to the third and fourth Generation) with a Love for Architecture and rural Improvements, will enlarge his Domain by dear Purchaſes, even

of

of controverted Titles, with Money borrowed at high Intereſt; and pay the Difference, and maintain the Litigation, out of his ancient Patrimony. He will build from a magnificent Plan, upon an elevated and commanding Situation, extending his Deſign as the Edifice riſes, with ſome new Ornament, or ſome additional Convenience; every Thing attended to, except the Means neceſſary to perfect the whole, or to enjoy it when finiſhed with Eaſe and Comfort. He improves and builds himſelf into Want and Bankruptcy, and then commences an Architect and Planner for others. In the World of Politicks, ſuch Schemiſts make their Appearance every Day; and ſhould their Schemes be executed, could they direct as well as plan for Adminiſtration, the Fate of this Nation would be the ſame as the undone Projector's; and *Great Britain*, exhauſted by her Efforts, would be numbered by future Hiſtorians among thoſe all-graſping Conquerors, who ſunk under the Weight of their own Acquiſitions.

Great and rapid as our Succeſſes abroad have been, the Wiſhes and Expectations of our Projectors at home conſtantly outſtript them: They grew with, and out-grew every Conqueſt: *Canada* gained, and with it a compleat Security for our *North-Ameri-*

can Colonies, from every Danger which had ever before been apprehended; all *Louiſiana* muſt be added, or the *French* will one Day invade us from thence: *Martinico*, *Guadaloupe*, *Marigalante* and the *Granadas* muſt be kept: nor ſhould we ſtop here, while *Hiſpaniola* affords Land enough to ſupply the *French* with Sugars for all the *European* Markets. *Cuba* opens an eaſy and defenceleſs Entrance to the Mines of *Peru* and *Mexico*: *Africa* and the *Eaſt-Indies* are ours; and *France* muſt renounce every Claim to the ſmalleſt Poſſeſſion in either.

But what are all theſe without an exclufive Fiſhery? *France* may again become a Naval Power. Nor will this be ſufficient; *Delenda eſt Carthago*. Our Projectors are learned in ancient Hiſtory, and they are communicative of their Learning. *Carthage*, they tell us, annihilated at Sea and broken at Land, threatened *Rome* with Ruin. But what ſent *Hanibal* into *Italy*? Shame, Rage, and Deſpair under oppreſſive and diſgraceful Terms of Peace, rouſing the dejected Spirits of his Fellow-Citizens, who in their Turn carried Terror and Diſmay into the very Heart of a proud Republick. It is true *Carthage* fell; and certain Studiers of Hiſtory

tory are apt to contract dangerous Prejudices in favour of Events, produced by Accidents with every human Probability againſt them, and to form Maxims upon ſuch for the Imitation of others : Mighty Empires have riſen upon Meaſures which have ſubverted numberleſs other States directed by the ſame Policy ; and by which they themſelves, in their progreſſive Courſe, have been expoſed to probable Ruin. But Succeſs dignifies the Means that procure it, while thoſe that fail are exploded with Contempt. Had *Hanibal* not ſtopt at *Capua*, his Victories and the Downfall of *Rome* would have produced a Set of Maxims, derived from the condemned Pride of the *Romans*, and the applauded Firmneſs of *Carthage*. But even in this Inſtance, the final Conſequences of having brought utter Ruin upon an Enemy, are not favourable to the Doctrine of our Speculatiſts ; after *Carthage* had been blotted from the Face of the Earth, the uncontrolled Power and unbounded Ambition of her Deſtroyer avenged her Cauſe : and *Rome*, decked in the Spoils of the World, fell a Victim to the Manes of her Rival.

Whoever ſuppoſes that I exaggerate the future extravagant Demands of the moſt ſanguine of the ſcheming Tribe, and inſiſts, that no Man can ever be ſo abſurd as not to

reſt contented with the Poſſeſſion of what we have already acquired; let him read (the Taſk will, indeed, be laborious) what hath been written upon theſe Subjects: Let him compare the Expectations of thoſe Writers, at the Commencement of this War, with their gradual Increaſe to the preſent Day; and he will be convinced, that the Terms, hoped for now by Multitudes, would then have appeared as wildly chimerical to all, as the total Diſſolution of *France* does to the ſobereſt Man among us. Nay, if he will follow the Principles of thoſe who would retain all that *Frauce* hath loſt, becauſe the Reſtitution of any Part may enable her hereafter to hurt us, they lead directly to this Concluſion; *We never can be ſafe, without a total Extinction of her Power.*

The Situation of *France*, with reſpect to us and the other Powers of *Europe*; her internal Strength, derived from natural and improved Advantages; a fertile Soil, covered with Eighteen Millions of People, ſkilled in Manufacture, with an inland Acceſs to many foreign Markets; are Circumſtances which would continue her a great and reſpectable Power, without a ſingle Poſſeſſion out of *Europe*, or a ſingle Ship to navigate the Seas.

But

But ſhe has ſtill Poſſeſſions in *America*; ſhe has ſtill Ships to annoy our Trade; to ſurpriſe ſome of our defenceleſs Settlements, to alarm our Coaſts, and affect our Credit by meditated Invaſions; which, however ridiculed, are rendered impracticable only by ſuperior Navies and numerous Armies: Means ill ſuited (in a permanent Syſtem) to the Condition of a commercial Country, already loaded and exhauſted by Drains and Burthens, ſeverely felt in every Species of domeſtick and foreign Commerce.

Further ſtill: *France* is in Alliance with the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and united with the Branches of her own Houſe; the *Dutch* are under the Awe of her ſuperior Force; and they, and all other Maritime Powers, are under the yet ſtronger Influence of commercial Intereſts, which bind them to her, and of commercial Jealouſies, which eſtrange them from us: Every Advantage we gain ſtrengthens thoſe Ties, and inflames thoſe Jealouſies. Where muſt this end? If our Security from *France* can only be obtained by Meanswhich render every other Nation inſecure from us; if, to avoid, one Day, being conquered and enſlaved, we muſt attain and preſerve the Means of deciding upon the Fate of the reſt of Mankind; unhappily

for

for *Europe*, and ſtill more unhappily for us, our Situation in the general Syſtem is totally altered: We have changed Sides with that Power which we formerly oppoſed, in conjunction with the World; and the Deſcendant of *Lewis* XIV. may head a grand Alliance, in a Maritime League, againſt the *Britiſh* Aſpirer to univerſal Monarchy. The *Spaniard* hath already taken the Alarm, and wages open War againſt us: The *Dutch* have done enough to demonſtrate their Diſpoſition to do more: And *Britain*, the ancient Friend of *Europe*, hath ſcarcely now an Ally who will be hired to ſtand her Second in a Conteſt. To ſuch Extremities are we led, by Principles of guarding againſt every diſtant and poſſible Danger, and of obtaining a Security, denied by Nature to every ſublunary Power.

Jealouſy, inſeparable from Liberty, was ever the Characteriſtic of *Britons*. But it partook of the Source from whence it ſprung, and operated in aboliſhing the Deſpotiſm of others, not in eſtabliſhing it in ourſelves. This Diſpoſition hath engaged us in many *preventive* Wars; an Epithet deviſed to define Meaſures where Offence could not be avowed, nor Defence from any immediate Attack pretended. But, with-

without entering into a Queſtion upon the Juſtice of thoſe Wars, or the Prudence of thoſe Terms by which they were ended, ſure it is, (as ſure as any general Propoſition can be) that Peace is the State moſt natural to us; and that not only thoſe Conteſts in which we ourſelves are Principals or Parties, but thoſe which deſolate other Countries, are injurious to our Intereſt. Every Impoveriſhment of them is the Loſs of a Cuſtomer to us; for the World is our Market, ſupplying thoſe Things neceſſary to us, taking in Return the Fruits of our Induſtry, and balancing the Difference with their Silver and Gold. Happy beyond the other Nations of *Europe* in our Climate and Soil, in what they give, and what they refuſe; while our Abundance, and our Wants, equally co-operate to connect us with the Univerſe; and make us, as Merchants, what we ought to be as Chriſtians, Friends to Man.

Such hath been that Sameneſs of Intereſt, which for Centuries rendered our Country the moſt favoured by every other. Our Growth was not envied, becauſe we grew by Means beneficial to all. Our Power was not dreaded, becauſe we aimed not at Conqueſts; and becauſe we employed, for the Defence of our Friends

in War, a Share of that Wealth which we acquired from them in Peace. The Cauſe of *Europe* was ours: In that we fought, and for that we conquered. Our Blood was ſpilt, and our Treaſures expended, not for Acquiſitions to ourſelves, but for Security to them; and our moſt ſucceſsful Wars ended in Treaties of Peace, which procured liitle Addition of Territory, valuable in any other View. From hence ariſes a proverbial Reflection, leſs juſt than it is generally conceived to be, that *France*, inferior in the Field, riſes ſuperior to us in the Cabinet; and hath often recovered from us by Policy, what ſhe loſt by Defeats in Battle. May our Stateſmen never vindicate their Abilities from this Reproach, by endeavouring at what cannot be obtained; by graſping what cannot be held; and by rendering our Condition deſperate in Peace, by overſtrained Efforts in War, protracted beyond a natural and reaſonable Period.

Some indeed there are, who appear more moderate in their Ideas of Peace, than thoſe Enthuſiaſts who would keep all, and conquer ſtill more. They do not poſitively inſiſt upon all that we are now poſſeſſed of; but of theſe, by far the greater Number would keep enough to render precarious to *France* what is yielded to her, and

to

to ſubject the Whole to an abſolute Dependance upon our Pleaſure. They all define alike a good Peace. It is ſuch as ſhall diſable *France* from hereafter annoying us; which, in other Words, imports a State of Subjection. But, even in that Caſe, the End of abſolute Security would not be obtained; for Hiſtory ſwarms with Inſtances of even Slaves riſing upon and deſtroying their tyrannical Maſters. They apprehend, and it cannot be denied, that *France*, recovering Strength, may, in a Courſe of Years, reſume her Arms, and recommence Hoſtilities againſt us. But it is equally certain, and it hath been already obſerved in the Inſtance of *Carthage*, that hard and injurious Terms of Peace will haſten that Event: And whatever the Iſſue of another Struggle may be, although ſtill more proſperous than the preſent; yet, circumſtanced as we are, another War, upon the Heels of this, would endanger our Ruin; and ſmall will the Comfort then be to our Beggars and Bankrupts, that *France* is more undone than they.

Men, deſperate in their Circumſtances, have nothing left worth the managing: They will hazard their laſt Stake upon a Caſt, with the Odds ever ſo much againſt them; and thoſe who are affronted in their

Honour proceed upon the ſame Maxim, and are actuated by a like Impulſe. They conſider what they have endured, more than any Sufferings to which they may befurther expoſed; and patient Indurance is the worſt Diſgrace. Nations feel like the Individuals of which they are compoſed; and the Succeſs of happy Temerities hath been ſo frequent in Experience, as to eſtabliſh a Maxim never wiſely to be departed from—*That a vanquiſhed Enemy ſhould not be puſhed to the laſt Extremities.* If we wander into Speculations, and indulge Apprehenſions of what *France* may attempt againſt us, when ſhe ſhall have recovered a ſufficient Force; why ſhall we refuſe to other Nations a like Liberty of ſpeculating upon a nearer Object, and more probable Event; upon the Danger of their being oppreſſed by thoſe, who inſiſt upon retaining, in their actual Poſſeſſion, an uncontrolled and reſiſtleſs Power of oppreſſing? An intractable Fondneſs for the Means, is the ſureſt Indication of a purpoſed End.

But ſhould the Nations of *Europe* remain patient Spectators; ſhould they conſider theſe Conſequences as too remote and problematical to engage their Interpoſition; yet what is there to induce *France* to accept of Terms more prejudicial to her Intereſt

and

and Independency, than even the Continuance of an unſucceſsful War, which hath already nearly ſtripped her of all ſhe can loſe in the Proſecution of it? If ſhe is to be deprived of all we can take from her, will ſhe ſuffer us to enjoy her ſpoils in Peace without Interruption, and without Expence? Humbled and defeated as ſhe is, *Old France* and *Spain* are ſtill entire: Our Triumphs in *Germany* will not tranſport us into *Alſace*, or tempt us to purſue our Conqueſts beyond the *Pirenean* Mountains: Our Superiority by Sea cannot intercept the *French* inland Trade on the Continent of *Europe*; while that Commerce by Sea, which is protected by the Law of Nations, and particular Treaties, will be continued by neutral Powers, even beyond the Bounds allowed in either: Our Commerce will be ſtill expoſed to Hazards and Loſſes, and our Settlements to Surprizes, from which the Vigilance of human Prudence, and the Power of ſuperior Force, cannot at all Seaſons, and in all poſſible Events, ſecure us through the wide Extent of Poſſeſſions ſcattered over the Face of the whole World; and other Places will be left as unguarded as *Newfoundland* hath always been; or the Expence of neceſſary Precautions in every Part, will weaken and undo the Whole.

Our

Our Revenue, increaſed as it may be by our Conqueſts, falls ſo ſhort of the Expences of our Fleets and Armies, that we every Year borrow immenſe Sums; and while we conquer Abroad, and inſiſt upon retaining our Conqueſts, Foreign Lenders acquire a Dominion in the very Heart of our Country; and our Lands and Houſes become mortgaged to them. They who in Peace ſupplied us with Money at low Intereſt, fructifying in Commerce with threefold Gain to our Merchants, now impoſe uſurious Terms upon our Neceſſities, for Sums annihilated in the Waſte and Conſumption of War. Nor is this the whole of our Loſs, and of the Benefits derived to them from it: The Burthens, which depreſs our Trade, furniſh them at once with Means and Opportunities of extending theirs at unrivalled Markets. They trade with our Money; and ſell, and will continue to ſell, upon cheaper Terms than we can afford, preſt down by heavy Taxes and high Intereſt. The Number of our Traders, and the Capital of our Trade are leſſened, while our Merchants purchaſe in our Funds an enormous Gain; ſecuring an Income to Indolence and Eaſe, beyond the Profits drawn by Induſtry and Pains from the richeſt Veins of Commerce. Such are the Effects of even a ſucceſsful War: Nor will

will they ceaſe with their Cauſe, although they increaſe with its Continuance; and Languor and Weakneſs, although the Fever be removed, prove often mortal to an exhauſted Patient.

Fatal as a perpetual War would be, and cruel beyond Barbariſm as thoſe Maxims are which lead to the total Extermination of an Enemy; yet in Prudence and Policy there is no ſafe and practicable Medium between that ſavage Extreme and Moderation in Proſperity. Treaties upon hard and diſgraceful Terms, impoſed upon a vanquiſhed Adverſary, can only produce a precarious Truce; rendering the ſame expenſive Meaſures neceſſary to guard againſt ſudden Attempts, as might be ſufficient to carry on War to its final Period. And every Ceſſion, ſhort of reaſonable and equitable Terms, made by the Conqueror as a Purchaſe for ſuch a Peace, far from rendering it more ſecure, only ſerves to haſten its Diſſolution, by ſooner enabling the injured to vindicate his Honour and his Intereſt.

Every State in *Europe* engaged in War, for at leaſt a Century paſt, hath ſat down with Loſs upon the Concluſion of Peace; And if the Conteſt between *Auſtria* and *Pruſſia*,

Pruſſia, which now deſolates *Germany*, can be compoſed by no other Means than a full Compenſation for Expence and Loſſes, we may pronounce that it never will end but in the total Ruin of one of the Parties; and that another War of thirty Years, may again be the Fate of that unhappy Country where this now rages. But blameable as ſuch an inflexible Obſtinacy would be in either of thoſe Powers, how much more inexcuſable would it appear in a People, whoſe Genius and Situation do not incline them to Conqueſt; whoſe beſt Intereſt is confined to the Defence and Improvement of what they have; who, upon this Principle, become an Overmatch for a Monarchy, by Nature incomparably their Superior; and who, departing from theſe conſtitutional Maxims, may, in the Fullneſs of Time, fall by the ſame Cauſes, which had firſt weakened their vanquiſhed Rival. If ſuch a Country be attacked, ſhe ſhould defend her Rights; ſhe ſhould retaliate for the Injuries ſhe hath received; ſhe ſhould attack in her turn; ſhe ſhould conquer, and retain as much of her Conqueſts as may ſerve to ſecure her old Poſſeſſions from probable Aſſaults; and to make it the permanent Intereſt of a weakened and diſcomfited Enemy to remain contented with what her Moderation allows him. This may poſ-

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ſibly afford no inaccurate general Definition of an equal Peace; and ſuch alone can be a good one, or, in other well-known Words, *Safe and Honourable*. A Step farther conſtitutes the Conqueror panting for Glory, and enamoured of Dominion, under the ſpecious Pretences of Compenſation for Injuries, and Security againſt Dangers: Terms as unlimited as the Deſires of thoſe, who aſſume to themſelves the ſole Right of defining them.

No Peace can be good that is not laſting. This general Propoſition, true in all Conditions, becomes more evident when applied to a Country plunged in Difficulties by War, from which many Years of Peace cannot intirely relieve her. And from the ſame Principle, in the ſame Circumſtances, a ſpeedy Peace is preferable to one more diſtant, by the whole Difference of Expence in a Continuance of War: That which would be a good Peace now, would have been better laſt Year by at leaſt as many Men, and as many Millions, as the War in 1762 hath coſt us. And ſhould this be unhappily lengthened to a more diſtant Period, the ſame Reaſoning will hold in much more than arithmetical Progreſſion. They who conſider the Miſeries of another

Nation as the chief Source of our Felicity, and their Weakneſs as our Strength, who ſay with reſpect to the falling *French*, as the Devil did to Man, *Evil be thou my Good*, may not admit this Doctrine. But with all the Glory we have acquired, and the Diſgrace, Expence, and Loſſes, which weaken the Strength, and cloud the ancient Reputation of *France*, I ſhall venture to aſſert, as a Friend to my Country, that better it had been if *France* had not driven us to the Neceſſity of waging War againſt her.

Theſe Reflections naturally lead to the following Inferences. In our Negotiations with *France*, the greater or leſs Facility of obtaining certain Objects, ſhould be rated as conſtituting no inconſiderable Part of their intrinſic Value; and for this plain Reaſon, becauſe they tend to haſten or protract the Concluſion of Peace, and to prolong or ſhorten its Duration. What tends to ſecure our ancient and indiſputable Property, ſhould have a Preference, from this Regard, to new Acquiſitions more unconnected with, and of more diſtant Importance to this Object; becauſe ſuch a Conduct will be leſs invidious to others, moſt agreeable to our real Intereſt, and to the Maxims under which we have proſpered

for

for Ages. And laſtly, in our Idea of Benefits, we ſhould not admit that dangerous and inhuman Maxim of negative Advantages to be obtained by Privation and Deſtruction. Such Notions well fit the Rage of War, and the barbarous Phrenzy of Conquerors laying waſte what they cannot enjoy; but would ill accord with the benign Nature of Peace, and with the liberal Genius of thoſe who excel in Induſtry and Arts, even more than in Atchievements of military Proweſs; although theſe have ſpread their Fame all over the World: Would it were falſe to add, and have excited Alarm as wide as Admiration!

In all theſe Views, and upon every equitable Principle, our Conqueſts in *North America* preſent themſelves as the firſt Object; and indeed it ſeems natural, that in concluding a Peace, we ſhould firſt turn our Eyes towards that Quarter where the War firſt aroſe, and in which the Cauſes that produced it were laid. The ſuperior Importance of our Acquiſitions there, the ſmaller Expence, and the fewer Hazards to which we ſhall be expoſed in preſerving them, are ſo clearly and amply explained by the Author of *The Intereſt of Great Britain conſidered, with regard to her Colonies*;

that an Attempt of ſaying any thing more upon this Subject would have been ſuperfluous, had not a Pamphlet lately made its Appearance on the other Side of the Queſtion, with much Ingenuity of Argument, and great Elegance of Style, abundantly ſufficient to confirm thoſe in their Errors, who were before inclined to the ſame Opinions, and to encourage and countenance Oppoſition to the only attainable Terms of Peace. For the Author's humane Diſpoſition (P. 92.) to purchaſe that greateſt of human Bleſſings with a Part of what we have acquired, will be of little avail, if the Conditions to be offered are ſuch as will not be ſubmitted to. The Effuſion of Blood muſt ſtill continue; and it will continue (if what the Author ſays be founded, that Expence and Loſs in War are near equal on both Sides (P. 93.).) until Terms of Peace be propoſed more agreeable to ſuch an Equality, than even his Moderation would dictate.

Voltaire obſerves, that the Balance of Power amongſt belligerant Parties in *Europe* ſtands ſo even, that the Wars of this Century have ended with little of Acquiſition to either. And however ſuperior our Succeſſes have been, yet while the internal Reſources

of

of *France* are ſuch as may enable her to bear Loſſes, which if fallen upon us would e'er now have overwhelmed us, longer than we can ſupply the Means of ſupporting a Conteſt; whatever our active Force may be, the Solidity of her paſſive Strength (if I may be allowed the Expreſſion) may at the End prove an Over-match for us. And ſhould that Experiment be tried to the full Extent of Ability in either Nation, one Maxim is inconteſtably true; that they will have the Advantage in Peace, who can longeſt endure the War. Should we then be reduced to offer what the Author would now reject; he will find (and as an honeſt Man he will grieve at the Diſcovery) that *France* holds *Canada* at much a higher Value than he rates it; and that a favourite Object of her Cares for more than a Century, will reſume its wonted Rank in the Councils of that Monarchy. When *France* had no Purpoſe to ſerve but that of Acquiſition; when ſhe could not mean to exaggerate the Importance of *Canada*, that it might appear to us a more valuable Ceſſion; (as ſhe did not mean to cede it) when what was written, and what was done, could only alarm our Fears and warn us of our Danger; yet numberleſs Books were publiſhed to explain its Importance; numberleſs Plans were formed,

ed, and numberleſs Attempts made, to carry thoſe Speculations into Realities. How far they at one Time ſucceeded; how near they were to ſucceeding ſtill further; with how much Expence of Blood and Treaſure, aſſiſted in ſome Inſtances by ſignal Interventions of Providence, we prevented a temporary Loſs, if not a total and irretrieveable Ruin; muſt be freſh in every Body's Memory, who goes no farther back than the Hiſtory of the preſent War: and who has not already forgotten *Braddock*'s Overthrow, *Murray*'s Defeat, *Johnſon*'s Deliverance, and *Wolfe*'s glorious Death and Victory. Such were the Perils to which we have been expoſed from *Canada*; and ſuch hath been the Strength derived from its Poſſeſſion for a Century paſt to a ſmall Number of *French* invading, terrifying, and endangering a Nation of *Britons*.

It is as idle to deny theſe Facts, and to aſſert, with this Author, that our Colonies were expoſed to ſlight Depredations and little Danger, (from P. 73 to 86.) as it is trifling and unfair to diſtinguiſh away *Canada* in its Effects, becauſe it is diſtinguiſhed in Name, from other Poſſeſſions which the *French* claimed on the ſame Continent. (P. 62. 63. 67. 71.) Had *France* any conſiderable

ſiderable Strength in any other Part? Did not all her other Eſtabliſhments draw their Exiſtence, their Supplies, and their Support from thence? Did not the *French* who led the Savages to *Braddock*'s Overthrow, come from *Canada?* Did not *Murray* and *Wolfe* fight in *Canada?* Was not *Johnſon* attacked, and *New York* menanced from thence? If the *French* had then ſucceeded, was not their Paſſage open, eaſy and ſhort, to a ſecure Port on the *Atlantic Ocean?* An Object often before attempted, never loſt Sight of, and without the Attainment of which, a Nation planted in *Canada*, equal to old *France*, would be of little avail to her. The Advantages obtained by *France* where ever they appeared, and the Dangers to us where ever they threatened, all had their Source in *Canada*. And as they could only ariſe from thence, the Poſſeſſion of *Canada* can alone ſecure us from them.

But this Diſtinction becomes the leſs neceſſary, and ſinks into a mere Diſpute about Words, while he, whoſe Opinions this Author combats, means with him, at leaſt the intire Poſſeſſion of that immenſe Tract of Territory, which extends from *Canada* to the Banks of the *Miſſiſſippi*. If more cannot be obtained, if *France* refuſes to yield to us what

what we have not conquered of *North America*; this Refusal furnishes still a stronger Proof of the Importance of what we have already acquired, by our Enemy's Attachment to a Territory yielding fewer Advantages. Fertile as *Louisiana* may be, much of what is comprehended within the Limits here described is as fertile, while the greater Difficulties of an Intercorse between that Settlement and *Europe*, by a more intricate, hazardous, and tedious Navigation, must proportionably reduce its Value to *France*.

The Author urges many Reasons, which, altho' insufficient to prove our Security, on a Supposition that *France* were permitted to repossess *Canada*, (P. 35.) are irrefragable against any Dangers to be apprehended from *Louisiana* bounded by the *Mississippi*. And there are Circumstances peculiar to this Settlement, which render those Arguments thus applied still stronger. A Colony long neglected, thin in People, and destitute of other internal Defence, is ill fitted for offensive Purposes. That immense River which separates it from us, receives many other smaller Rivers from our Territory. The Current of them all in our Favour; and the Advantages which *Louisiana* may derive from an *Indian* Trade through this Circumstance,

ſtance, are ſufficiently lowered by the Author not to need any further Diminution. (P. 49.) Yet the Stream which brings the Savage with his Furrs and Skins to the *French* Market, impedes his Return with Commodities more difficult to carry. And were the Value and Conveniences of that Trade much greater to *France*, yet the Security we ſhould obtain from the Courſe of the Rivers, would be an abundant Compenſation for them. Security of our old Poſſeſſions and our old Rights is the Object of greateſt Importance to us: The Invaſion of theſe, and the Defence of them, cauſed the many bloody Conteſts, in which we and *France* have been engaged upon the *American* Continent with various Succeſs. In this View (and in this only) hath *Canada* been important to *France*; and in this View, altho' it ſhould yield no more than the pitiful Import which the Author brings to its Account, (P. 49.) (in which by the Bye he omits a moſt material and valuable Article of Fiſhery) yet the Purchaſe was well made, at the Expence of much Blood and immenſe Treaſure. Great as the Examiners Authority may be, and ingenious and artful as his Arguments certainly are, to prove that our Colonies neither incurred Danger, nor can receive Defence from *Canada*; he hath

the Opinion of two great Nations to contend with, *that* Canada *is virtually the* Britiſh *Empire in* North America.

But, it ſeems, this boaſted Empire is no more than a ſecondary Object; yielding ſo far in Importance to our Sugar Iſlands, that "one White Man in the *Weſt Indies* "is worth, to the Trade of his Mother "Country, about Eight in *North Ame-* "*rica*," (P. 30.) And, in this Proportion, Ninety thouſand Whites, the computed Number in all our Iſlands, enervated, ſickly, and ſhort-lived, ſtand in Value to 1,500,000 *(ibid.)* Inhabitants of a more healthy Soil, conſtantly doubling, by natural Increaſe, in leſs than Twenty-five Years, and recruited every Year, in Time of Peace, by about Twelve thouſand Foreigners. "For if a Million and a Half of Inhabi- "tants in *North America* (to ſay nothing "of the Troops) took off, in the Year "1758, but 1,832,948 *l.* 13 *s.* 10 *d.* and "Ninety thouſand Inhabitants in the *Weſt* "*Indies* 877,571 *l.* 19 *s.* 11 *d.* it appears, at "a Glance, how much more valuable the "Trade of the *Weſt Indies* is than the "Trade of *North America*, in Proportion "to the Number of Inhabitants," (P. 30, 31.) But does it appear, at a Glance, that the

the Whole of our Exports to the *Weſt Indies* is conſumed there? or conſumed by the Whites only? And is not a Part employed in Trade with the *Spaniſh* Main? Or, to allow the Author's Argument the full Scope of his Aſſertion, does it neceſſarily follow, from a greater proportional Conſumption of our Commodities in the *Weſt Indies*, that their Trade, under all the Circumſtances attending them, is, in like Proportion, more valuable to us? and that a White with them is worth Eight in *North America*, becauſe his Share of that Conſumption ſtands in this Proportion? Theſe Points ſhall be now examined: Nor ſhall the Inference, P. 31, "That we ſhould make the Increaſe "of our Poſſeſſions between the Tropicks "the primary and leading Object of our "Policy," go without Obſervation in its due Place.

As to the firſt Point; our Author is too well inſtructed in the Matter, upon which he treats, not to admit, that an increaſing Trade is, in this Reſpect, ſuperior to another near at a Stand, and which, in his Opinion, is not ſuſceptible of any great Improvement. (P. 29.) But if this Circumſtance can create a Preference in any Inſtance, how ſuperlatively muſt it operate in favour of *North Ame-*

America, compared with our *Weſt Indies*? Our Exports to the laſt hardly at all increaſe: The Author admits the Fact, and builds upon it, (his Inference ſhall hereafter be conſidered) (P. 29.) Nor does he controvert the Authenticity of an Account given by the *Conſiderer*, (P. 57) in which it appears, that the Exports to *North America* have gone on increaſing from 640,114 *l.* 12 *s.* 4 *d.* in 1744, to 1,832,948 *l.* 13 *s.* 10 *d.* in 1758; while the Supply to our *Weſt Indian* Iſlands, which, in the firſt of theſe Years, amounted to 796,112 *l.* 17 *s.* 3 *d.* roſe in the laſt only to 877,571 *l.* 19 *s.* 11 *d.* And as, in the above aſtoniſhing Increaſe, the Quantity of Exports to *North America* appears to have near doubled its Value in Ten Years, and in 1758 was more than double the Demand from the *Weſt Indies*; there is no Reaſon to ſuppoſe, that the ſame immenſe Diſproportion will not proceed in a progreſſive Increaſe; and that, in the Year 1768, the Exports to *North America* will not ſtand to the other as One is to Four.

Let the Author now anſwer: Is it ſo very clear, that we ſhould make the Increaſe of a Trade, thus circumſtanced, the primary and leading Object of our Policy, by an Addition of more Poſſeſſions between the Tropicks; which, if freed from other

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Objections, that ſhall hereafter be explained, muſt ever remain ſubject to one, the moſt capital and important, in common with thoſe Iſlands which we have long poſſeſſed, without any Increaſe of White Inhabitants, and where the lamentable Waſte of Diſeaſe and Death can alone be ſupplied from *Great Britain?* But, in the Author's Calculation of the Value of Man, Health, Strength, and long Life, are unimportant Circumſtances; and a White, who lives not half his Days, and thoſe conſumed in Luxury and Idleneſs, who leaves behind him, if any, a ſcanty Progeny, inheriting the Diſeaſes, Weakneſs, and Indolence of their Parent, would, in the *Weſt Indies*, be worth Eight Antediluvians in *North America*, cultivating a Country with their Hands, and peopling it with their Iſſue; yet to Men reſembling theſe nearer than the preſent Race of Mortals does in any other Part of the known World, (P. 75) are we indebted for an Increaſe of Wealth, more than doubling with the ſtupendous Increaſe of their Numbers.

If it be granted, that (P. 24) the *Weſt Indies* might be ſupplied directly from *England* with Articles which come from our Northern Plantations, " it is admitted, not

" quite

" quite ſo cheap, nor with ſo much Conve-
" nience," with Plank, Lumber, and Staves, of which we do not produce, in any degree, ſufficient for our own Uſe; yet if the Importance of theſe Supplies, and the Loſs and Expence of having them from *Great Britain*, could be accurately calculated, it would be found, that, if *North America* with-held her Produce, it would be attended with ſtill more fatal Conſequences to her Neighbours than to her, with a Loſs of ſtill more than Three Fourths of their whole Trade, (P. 25.) And what is ſaid in P. 20, of their Trade with us, is as truly applicable to that which they carry on with *North America*, " neceſſary to them as their Exiſtence." From hence it follows, that whatever the Value of a White Man may be in the *Weſt Indies* to the Mother Country, (even if rated at 23 *l.* Sterling) (P. 99), the *North American* juſtly claims a large Proportion of it; which, if fairly deducted from one and added to the other, will immenſely raiſe the Figure of the injured *Penſilvanian*, debaſed by this Author, even ſo low as 20 *s.* in Value, P. 99. What the *North Americans* loſe in Importance at home, ſhould be allowed them abroad; where their Induſtry is more uſeful to the few helpleſs Planters of Sugar and Indigo than to their

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own numerous Neighbourhood, equally poſſeſſed of Superfluities, the Fruits of their own Induſtry.

The Trade for ſalted Beef from *Ireland* (P. 21) will ſtill remain unrivalled and unleſſened by any Part of *North America*; while *Newfoundland* contributes largely, by its Conſumption of that and other Articles of Proviſion, to the Advantages derived from the *Iriſh* Trade: And whatever the Conſumption of *Britiſh* Merchandize, by Individuals, may be in different Places, we have already obſerved the ſuperior Increaſe of the Quantities called for by the whole Aggregate of our Northern Colonies.

The Author confeſſes, in P. 24. "That "the inſular and continental Colonies of "*America*, are reciprocally beneficial to "each other": but he adds, that "the Be-"nefit, tho' reciprocal, is not equal." Neither indeed is it, but in a Senſe very different from his. In the great Articles of Defence and Navigation, the Superiority is wholly on the Side of the latter; who in the Day of Danger have importantly co-operated with us in our Fleets and Armies, for the Protection of defenceleſs Iſlands. In War and in Peace, their Seamen and their Ships are employed

ployed with ours, to and from thoſe Ports, which never fitted out a Veſſel or bred from among the Natives a ſingle Mariner. By what Superiority in other Articles are theſe balanced? If the *Weſt Indies* ſupply *North America* with Produce and Manufacture peculiar to them, *North America* hath alſo her Productions, as excluſively hers; and Rice and dried Fiſh are at leaſt as much Neceſſaries of Life in the one, as Spirits and Melaſſes in the other. Corn, Flour and Bread produced in *Europe*, are to the *Weſt Indies*, by reaſon of its Diſtance, almoſt as if they did not exiſt there. And that the Balance of Trade between the *Weſt Indies* and *North America* (P. 23.) is always conſiderably in favour of the latter, is as certain, as that this Fact demonſtrably proves the greater Dependence of the Iſlands upon the Continent: or, in other Words, that they want moſt of what is produced by the other. Yet the Inference drawn by the Author is the reverſe; and he extends it to *Africa*, as well as to our Northern Colonies, which he affects to rank in the ſame Order, with a View to leſſen the Importance of the laſt. But immenſely more conſiderable as the *Weſt Indian* Trade is, abſtractedly conſidered, than the *African*, yet this is certainly not a dependent Member upon the other. (P. 24.)

(P. 24.) *Africa* might ſell her Slaves to other Nations, and other of our Colonies. She actually does; but the *Weſt Indies* cannot produce a ſingle Sugar Cane without her Aſſiſtance. If this does not create a Dependence, I know nothing that can; and were we thus circumſtanced with regard to *Sweden*, *Denmark* and *Ruſſia*, for our naval Stores; could *North America* not afford a Supply; we ſhould certainly be, with all our Trade and all our Wealth, in a total Dependence for both upon Countries much leſs conſiderable than ours. The Author, before he infers a Dependence of our *North American* and *African* Trade upon our *Weſt Indian*, from " the Riſe or Fall of thoſe, as the latter flouriſhes or decays;" P. 24. ſhould be better prepared to prove than he ſeems to be, that the ſame Conſequences would not reſpectively follow, in ſtill greater Degree, were the Suppoſition inverted. That this Effect would not attend in *North America* a Riſe or Decline in the *Weſt Indies*, is ſufficiently apparent from the amazing Increaſe of its Trade, while that of the other hath been near at a ſtand. But he who would give up *Senegal* and *Gorce* for the *French* Conqueſts in *Germany*, (P. 91.) and who is of Opinion that *Canada* might be reſtored without Loſs or Danger, (P. 85.)

acts consistently in representing *Africa* and *North America* not only in a secondary Light, (P. 25.) but as dependent Members. P. 24.

The Examiner complains, P. 27. that in *The Interest of Great Britain considered*, instead of a complete Account of our Exports to, and Imports from, *North America* and the *West Indies* respectively, the first Part is only given, and to supply this Defect he gives the whole, but for one Year only. Had he transcribed the last half Sheet of the Pamphlet he answers, it would have appeared, that the Exports to *North America*, which from 1744 to 1748 inclusive, exceeded those to the *West Indies* only in the Sum of 122,936*l.* 10*s.* 4*d.* went on increasing in so much a larger Proportion, as to create an additional Difference from 1754 to 1758, also inclusive, of 3,646,215*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* In each of the three last Years of this Period, the Exports to *North America* are more than double, and in the two first nearly double of what he states the whole *North American* annual Produce. P. 100. He could not resist the Temptation, under a fallacious and ambiguous Expression, to cast a Balance so favourable to *Guadaloupe*, as to leave a Difference of only 18,413*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* between

tween her Returns and the Produce of all the *North American* Colonies put together: and therefore he meaſures the whole Quantity of that Produce by their Exports hither, as ſtated in P. 27. This Attempt explains his Fondneſs for contraſting the Imports from *North America*, with thoſe from the *Weſt Indies*, and accounts for the *Conſiderer*'s giving the Exports from hence only, and not miſleading his Reader by an inconcluſive Compariſon. For the Advantages of Trade with any Country, can only be determined by the Exports of our own conſequential upon it. The Product of our *Weſt Indies* was all conſumed here, becauſe the whole did not exceed the Home Demand; and it bore a higher Price here than it would in any other Market to which it could be conveyed. In 1758, it amounted to 1,834,036*l.* 2*s.* 2*d.* for which Returns were made from hence to the Value of 877,571*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.* P. 27. The Produce of *North America* imported here in the ſame Year, was not one Third of its whole Export, becauſe it produced more than we demanded; and the Value of that Surplus was by Conſequence more at other Markets, than it would have been at ours. But altho' the Imports from thence did not riſe higher than 648,683*l.* 0*s.* 4*d.* yet our Ex-

ports thither being 1,832,948*l.* 13*s.* 10*d.* it would be abſurd to take the Meaſure of national Gain from the firſt, and not the laſt of theſe Sums. Yet to the *North American* Account muſt be added, the Profits upon Re-exportation, which in Furs, Rice, and Tobacco, brings us more from Foreigners than the Value of the whole Import from *North America* above ſtated. Thus, beſide a Supply for our own Wants, *North America*'s Exports create a Balance in our Favour with other Countries to which ſhe and we trade; and if we conſider the Nature of thoſe Wants which ſhe ſupplies, few of them will appear the Cravings of Luxury, while we ſtand indebted for many Materials of Manufacture, and for many naval Stores, to that inexhauſtible Poſſeſſion. Whether the Returns in *Britiſh* Manufactures be paid for in Tobacco from *Virginia*, or in *Jamaica* Sugars purchaſed by *New England*, in a Balance of Trade it matters little. The only Queſtion of Importance is, which of the Colonies, our *Weſt Indian* or *North American*, contribute moſt, whether mediately or immediately, to the Value of our Lands, and to the Labour and Employment of our People? A Queſtion which it is impoſſible not to decide greatly in Favour of *North America*.

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The Author further obſerves, (P. 25.) "On the relative Value to *Great Britain* of "our *Weſt Indian* and Northern Colonies, "that the Duties impoſed upon Sugar form "no contemptible Object in our Revenue; "while no one Commodity of *North Ame-* "*rica*, except Tobacco, (he might alſo "have excepted Rice, Furs, and Skins) is "in the leaſt ſubſervient either there or "here to our Expences, and to the Sup- "port of the general Intereſt." But they are ſubſervient to that Intereſt in its beſt underſtood and moſt important Senſe: They ſerve Navigation and Manufacture; and from their univerſal Uſe, claim and have obtained an Exemption from Burthens juſtly impoſed upon barren Luxury. This Circumſtance urged by the Author as favourable to his Cauſe, turns directly againſt him. When, in P. 37. he magnifies the Importance of *Guadaloupe*, by the Benefits ariſing from the Cotton it produces, he doth not propoſe to increaſe thoſe Advantages by impoſing a Duty upon it; for he well knows it is much more valuable to the Public, by being freed from ſuch a Burthen.

"In *Guadaloupe* a Material of Manufac- "ture may (in his Eſtimation) be of greater "commercial Conſequence than Sugars."

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Why then (in P. 27.) hath he omitted "to "direct the Reader's Attention" to this Conſequence, in Favour of *North America?* He might have beſtowed a few Lines upon Oil, Iron, Staves, Furs, Flax-ſeed, Indigo, and Skins; to which he might have added, though not all in the ſame Predicament, Turpentine, Pitch, Tar, and Maſts. He might have ſhewn, that with ſuch Imports, Wealth flows in upon us; that the Expences of Government can be ſupplied from no other Stock; and that the enormous Debt contracted during this War cannot be cleared, or even leſſened, by any other Means than thoſe, which, furniſhing Induſtry with Materials for Employment, and Art for Improvement, enable all Ranks of People to conſume even taxed Luxuries, among which Sugar indeed "forms no contemptible Ob-"ject." (P. 25.) He might have inferred, or his Readers would have ſpared him the Trouble, that while the *Weſt Indies* are indebted for their Produce to the Supplies they receive from *North America*; they are further indebted to her for a Part of the Conſumption of that Produce here, upon which he makes their Exiſtence depend. (P. 20.) But this Inference would draw her from that "ſecondary Light" in which ſhe had been before placed, and exalt her

" from a dependent Member," to be " the " primary Object in the Syſtem of our Co- " lonies." (P. 25.) Such *North America* really is. Rich in the Produce of every Climate, and every Soil; already greatly, though unequally, inhabited; grown in Population (with a Certainty of infinitely a greater Growth) beyond Example, and almoſt beyond Belief; yet leſs wonderful in her Numbers, than in the Increaſe of thoſe Advantages we derive from them; for theſe double, as hath been already obſerved, in half that Time, which only doubles the Race that produces them. Here indeed Humanity cannot refrain from lamenting, that ſome, although by much the ſmalleſt, Part of thoſe Advantages can only be obtained from *North America*, by Means, which, while they enrich the Planter, diſgrace the human Species; and that our Southern Provinces upon the Continent, as far as they partake of the Nature of our Iſlands, ſhare, although in much a ſmaller Degree, the Opprobrium juſtly thrown upon them. (P. 67.)

But our Author tells us, (P. 23.) " It is " by Means of the *Weſt Indian* Trade that " a great Part of *North America* is at all " enabled to trade with us; and that we

" ſhould

" ſhould well conſider before we give up " *Guadaloupe*, an Iſland worth to us 600,000*l.* " a Year." P. 94. We ſhall ſoon ſee, even from his own State of the Imports from, and Exports to, that Iſland, that not above Two-fifths of this Sum remain with us; and that much the greateſt Proportion of the Surplus, if not all, muſt center in *France*. But how doth he prove his firſt Propoſition? As I have already remarked, he admits, with the Author of *The Intereſt of Great Britain conſidered*, that our *Weſt Indian* Trade is near at a Stand; and he doth not controvert the Account, by which it appears, that our Exports to *North America* have doubled in ten Years. How then can this ſurpriſing Increaſe be paid for by the *Weſt Indies*, " either in Caſh, or in Bills " drawn by the *Weſt Indian* Merchant, on " *London*, or in the Return of *Weſt Indian* " Produce on *North American* Account?" (P. 23.) He doth not ſay, that the Balance to the *Weſt Indies* is increaſed: That Trade he tells us is at a Stand. The *African* demand is ſtill ſupplied out of it, and the Expences of *Weſt Indian* Planters, reſident in *England*, are not leſſened (P. 28): An Advantage to us, ſuch as it is, which no Friend to the *Weſt Indies*, except our Author, wiſhes to be increaſed, or even continued

nued from thence; and which no one but an Enemy to our Northern Colonies, except himſelf, wiſhes to be ſupplied by them. Will the Author venture to ſolve this Paradox, by aſſerting that the *Weſt Indian* Planters, however extravagant here, are become ſo much more prudent at home, as to afford from their Parſimony a Sufficiency to anſwer an immenſely increaſing Demand of *North American* Supplies? Doth that Increaſe actually exiſt in ſuch Proportion? If it doth, why are not its beneficial Effects felt in the *Weſt Indian* Trade? And why ſhould that be at a Stand? If our Balance from the North could be diſcharged by no other Means, the hoſpitable and luxurious *Weſt Indian* Planter would, in Time, be reduced to feed upon no better Fare, than he allows to the Man-beaſt, who is now goaded by his inhuman Driver. But while the Imports here remain unaugmented, and the Draughts upon them for *Britiſh* Goods for the *African* Trade, and for the Expences of *Weſt Indians* dwelling here remain the ſame, how is the Fund to ariſe in *Weſt Indian* unincreaſing Imports, to anſwer the immenſe Increaſe of Exports to *North America*? Until ſome better Solution can be found for this Problem, we muſt be contented with one plain and obvious. The

Trade of our *North American* Colonies goes on augmenting to our own and other Countries, yielding us many of thoſe uſeful Articles in Manufacture and Navigation, upon which all our Trade depends, which were purchaſed by us before, and are ſtill in too great a Degree brought to us, from the Northern Nations of *Europe*, who take little from us in return except our Money. The *North American* Trade, with other Countries of *Europe*, is increaſed by an annual Influx of Money from *Mexico* and *South America* into thoſe Countries, and is in Things, moſt of which we cannot furniſh: In others produced in common with us, which are either wanted at home, or lie more convenient to other Markets. Or if we meet with a *North American* there, we find a Fellow Subject inſtead of a foreign Rival; while in return for any ſmall Diſadvantage felt in the Sale of our Produce, we receive an ample Recompence from them in a vent of Manufactures, worth four times the Price of their Materials. (P. 65.) Such are the Advantages, and ſuch are the Cauſes, of this immenſe Increaſe of a growing Empire, which already raiſes us to a Level with the moſt Mighty in *Europe*; and beſide increaſing our Commerce, ſupplies, by an incredible Increaſe of People, that only Defect,

which

which confined us, as a State, to the third or fourth Place in the Scale of *European* Powers.

If, as I flatter myſelf it now appears, our *North American* Colonies are of an Importance greatly ſuperior to our *Weſt Indies*; let us examine how far, in the Author's Argument, theſe may be rendered more conſiderable to us, and the general Intereſt of the Nation be improved by retaining *Guadaloupe*.

The Number of Whites in *Guadaloupe* are computed by the Author (P. 99) at Ten thouſand; and the Owners of Lands there, whether reſident or not reſident in *Old France*, have their Property ſecured to them by Capitulation. While therefore our Faith is preſerved, they cannot be reſtrained from enriching their Mother Country with the Expenditure or Superfluity of their Income. What the Amount of this may be to *Old France*, may be nearly collected from an Account of the Imports in 1761, and the Exports in 1760, to and from *Guadaloupe*, as given us by this Author, with a View to magnify the Value of that Iſland to *Great Britain*; and it ſtands in P. 43 and 44 thus,

Imports from —	£	603,269	3 9
Exports to —		118,569	5 10
For 4000 Negro Slaves purchased there this Year,		120,000	0 0
		238,569	5 10

Here it muſt be remarked, that the Whole of this laſt Article cannot be fairly brought to our Account of Gain from *Guadaloupe*, as ſuch an extraordinary Supply to that Iſland hath been proportionably detrimental to our other Colonies; whoſe Demands for that Article never have been, and never can be, exceeded by the Number of Slaves brought to them from the *African* Coaſt. Nor will this be only a temporary Diſadvantage to them, who have the comfortable Proſpect opened, in P. 42, of its future Continuance; and the Author's Aſſurance, that *Guadaloupe* will "be the very "beſt Market for Slaves."

Thus it appears, in a fair Inference from the Facts produced by this Author, that a very conſiderable and diſproportionate Share of the clear Balance of Import and Export, to and from this new Acquiſition, remains the Property of *France*; increaſing with the Improve-

Improvements of that Iſland; earned with a grievous and juſtly complained of Loſs to our old Settlements; (not only in our Sugar Iſlands, but alſo in our Southern Continent of *America*) who already feel, in the high Price and Scarcity of Slaves, the Miſchief of having thoſe annual Supplies intercepted from them; the Fruits of whoſe Labour would all ultimately center in *Great Britain*.

The ſuperior Importance of our old Poſſeſſions, beyond this new one, cannot be better demonſtrated than by one Part of an Account brought by the Author, in P. 27, to ſerve another Purpoſe. And, as I mean to anſwer him by his own Facts, I take the Years and Valuations as he ſtates them.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Imports from our *Weſt Indies* in 1759,	1,834,036	2	2
Exports to the *Weſt Indies* in 1758,	877,571	19	11
To which ſhould be added, *Britiſh* Merchandize ſent from hence for the Purchaſe of Slaves in 1761,	254,381	11	5
Eaſt India Goods	78,576	18	6
	1,210,530	9	10

Theſe

Theſe two laſt Articles are as properly introduced here, as the whole Value of the Slaves, intercepted by *Guadaloupe* from our other Colonies, was unfairly admitted, to ſwell the Sum of our Exports thither, and the Advantages derived to us from thence. But, even thus exaggerated, how diſproportionably ſmall does it appear, in that moſt eſſential and evident Article of national Gain; a Vent of the Product of our Soil, Induſtry, and Commerce. The Exports to our own *Weſt Indies*, as above ſtated, are as Two to Three; while thoſe to *Guadaloupe* do not exceed Two to Five: How much of the remaining Three Fifths is ſent to *France* cannot, with Preciſion, be ſaid. That very little of it is ſpent by *Guadaloupians* here is certain; and it is equally certain, that, as no Money is ever remitted from hence to the *Weſt Indies*, (P. 28) the whole remaining Third of the Balance due from us to our old Poſſeſſions is cleared, in one Shape or another, by *Britiſh* Commodities. In P. 17 the Author aſſerts, that "the (*French*) "*Weſt Indies* furniſhed (*France*) with an "exported Produce worth 2,070,471 *l.* a "Year, all which was purchaſed by her "Manufactures." Now, if this be true, it is a further Proof of the much greater Importance of Poſſeſſions to the Mother Country,

try, which are peopled from thence, than of others, where (altho' the Dominion be acquired to the Crown) a large Share of the Property muſt ſtill remain with the old Inhabitants. And blameable would that Policy be, which would retain theſe at the Expence of the former. Theſe Circumſtances, upon every Principle of equitable Accommodation, point out *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe* as a proper Exchange for all that *France* poſſeſſed and claimed in *North America*, as far as the *Miſſiſſipi* runs; the laſt being moſt important to us, as the firſt is to her. By ſuch Adjuſtments alone can a ſpeedy Peace be obtained, and upon ſuch Principles alone can a permanent Peace be eſtabliſhed, while that which is yielded with leaſt Difficulty, will be retained with leaſt Hazard and Expence.

But our Author tells us, "*Guadaloupe*, in "the natural Courſe of Things, muſt, in a "few Years, be almoſt wholly *Engliſh*," (P. 46.) Is this Prediction juſtified by Experience in other Acquiſitions, ceded to us by former Treaties, in *Europe* and *America*? Did the *Minorquines* become more *Engliſhmen* by being upwards of Forty Years ſubject to the Crown of *Great Britain*? Did not the *Acadians* ſtill remain *French* during the

the ſame Period? while a pretended Neutrality diſguiſed a ſecret Enemy. Would the *Spaniards* remain in *Jamaica* after it became *Engliſh?* or the *French* in that Part of *St. Chriſtopher*'s which was yielded to us? Thoſe of *Guadaloupe*, indeed, would certainly not follow the Example of theſe latter, and quit the Iſland; but retaining the ſame Attachments there, would render more real Service to *France*, than they could by a Migration into any other of her Poſſeſſions. And ſatisfied as ſome *Guadaloupians* may be under our Dominion, and impoſſible as it is now for the Diſſatisfied to free themſelves from it, will not the Multitude of Proprietors in that Iſland, who now ſhew which Country they eſteem their Home, by making it the Repoſitory of their Wealth, avail themſelves of the Security of Peace to aſſiſt that Country in any Attempt of regaining the Whole of what it hath loſt? Confident I am, that the Author's Allowance of one Regiment would not be thought a ſufficient Security againſt ſuch an Event, (P. 52); and that the Attachment of *Frenchmen* to their Mother Country, and the Maxims of *France* with regard to the Obligations of Treaties, will require a far larger and more expenſive military Eſtabliſhment to protect *Guadaloupe* from their Effects.

Inde-

Indefinite as the growing Demand of Sugars may be, (and it increaſes no where ſo much as in our own Market, for an every Day increaſing Conſumption) yet the Means by which that Produce is raiſed are limited; and the Number of Slaves furniſhed by *Africa* rather diminiſhes than increaſes. This Circumſtance muſt ſet Bounds to the Production of Sugars, altho' there ſhould be none to the Demand. And the Conſequence muſt neceſſarily be, what it apparently is, an Increaſe of Price: While thoſe Iſlands, which have natural Advantages over ours (as *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe* are repreſented by the Advocates for their Importance) will be better able to pay higher Prices for Slaves, and will be the firſt ſupplied, (P. 42.) when our Slave Markets ſhall be thrown open to them, equally with our old Poſſeſſions, which muſt then be contented, as the *French* formerly were, with a neglected Refuſe.

Were the Sugars of the World to be imported here, ſuch an Abundance would naturally add, in the firſt Place, to the amazing Increaſe of its Conſumption at home, attended by another, which in the general Uſe of Tea is already pernicious to at leaſt the lower Ranks of our People.

Certain it is, and the Author confeſſes the Fact (P. 16.) that before the War, the Production of our Colonies did not furniſh enough for our increaſing Uſe: And if after devouring our own, the Deficiency was ſupplied from *France*, under all the Hazards and Difficulties of a contraband Trade; our inſatiable Appetite, increaſing as it is fed, may juſtify the Apprehenſions of the *Conſiderer*, (P. 46.) "that moſt of what can be im-"ported from any additional Acquiſitions "would alſo ſtop here." To which he might have added, as I have above obſerved, the Growth of another Evil, inſeparable from this; the increaſing Conſumption of a hurtful foreign Luxury, and the Decreaſe of a valuable Export.

Great as the natural Advantages of the *French* Sugar Iſlands are repreſented, we have certainly been long in Poſſeſſion of one Advantage, extremely important to ours: We have poſſeſſed, in a ſuperior Degree, the *African* Market; while their Supplies were only the Gleanings of ours, and being in a great Proportion, in Deſpite of ſevere Penalties, ſupplied by us, they purchaſed at a higher Price an inferior Merchandize. While our Navigation in the *African* Seas, and our Settlements upon the Coaſts, to which this War

War hath added, remain ſuperior to theirs, that Market muſt be ours ſtill, in a greater Extent than it ever yet hath been: And leſs important will a Reſtitution of their Iſlands be to them, if we retain a greater Share, than we had before, of the only Means by which their Importance can be maintained. I repeat it again, the Slave-Trade is limited and declining; it is eſſential to every *Weſt Indian* Production; and every Slave intercepted by *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe* from *Jamaica*, *Barbadoes*, the *Leeward Iſlands*, and our Southern Continent, is ſo much taken from them, who would finally return the Whole of its Value to us, in order to beſtow it where not above Two Fifths become ours.

I ſhall not pretend to ſay, how far *Jamaica* may be improved, nor join with thoſe who aſſert, that Two-parts in Three of that Iſland, fit for the Production of Sugars, lye uncultivated; which with the other Third might be rendered ſufficient to ſerve all *Europe*. I believe this Account exaggerated: But enough of it remains inconteſtably true, to render it diſputable, whether the inſatiable Avarice of Monopoliſts there, or the ſupine Neglect here, in thoſe whoſe Intereſt directs them, and whoſe Power enables

them to controul the moſt lawleſs Abuſe of legal Grants, be moſt ſhamefully blameable. But a Neglect of what is our own, hath long been the Diſgrace of this Country, in Iſlands much nearer our Obſervation than *Jamaica*. The Extravagance of ſtraining at more, while this Neglect continues, hath however not been the Sin of former Times. This ſeems reſerved for thoſe who would now have this Nation imitate the Example of leſſer Monopoliſts, and be to other Countries, what the *Jamaica*-Planter is to his own. It is certain, that *Jamaica* hath increaſed its Produce: it is as certain, that this Increaſe may be carried ſtill farther, without expenſive Roads, blowing up Rocks and erecting Bridges, every two or three hundred Yards: (Int. of Col. P. 46.) and it is equally certain, that this Effect may be produced by other Cauſes, than an advanced Price of Sugars, beyond their preſent immoderate Rate: *(Ibid.)* and that a lowering of their Price, would be the neceſſary and immediate Conſequence of Improvements, which at the ſame Time would preſerve the Health, and ſave the Lives of Thouſands. But if to the Advantages of Soil in the *French* Sugar Iſlands, and to ſome Qualities in their People, ſpending little and ſaving much from ſmall Profits, we add cheap and

plentiful

plentiful Supplies of the beſt Slaves from the Coaſt of *Africa*, and of Lumber and other Neceſſaries from our *North America*, purchaſed with Credit at low Intereſt; then indeed the Exertion of better Policy would come too late for the Relief of *Jamaica*; ſhe and our other Iſlands, the Plants of *Britiſh* Soil, muſt wither under the Shade of their ſpreading Neighbours.

Thus far I have followed the *Examiner*, and I ſhall follow him but a little further; merely as far as the Title prefixed to his Pamphlet leads me, and his profeſſed Deſign (P. 1.) of enabling us to determine, how far it will be conſiſtent with our Intereſt, on a ſimilar Occaſion, to adopt or reject that Syſtem of Pacification, which appears in the Negotiation of 1761. Whether our Miniſters did or did not depart from "the "fundamental Principle of the Treaty, "laid down by *France* herſelf." P. 90. is not the Queſtion now, whatever it might then have been. That Treaty hath been long at an End: And if they relaxed in the Courſe of it, the Preſumption is ſtrong, that they could not prevail in a more rigid Interpretation of Terms not ſo clear, but that they required a further Explanation; which when given by *France*, fell very

ſhort of the Extent, in which they were underſtood by ſome of our Cabinet. I have therefore left, and ſhall ſtill leave the *Examiner* in full Enjoyment of his Triumph over the late Adminiſtration, upon the Inferiority of thoſe *Poſſeſſions*, which *France* was to yield, in Compenſation for thoſe to be ceded to us; reſtraining as he does the Word *Poſſeſſions*, to the reſpective Conqueſts made by both Parties. (P. 90.) If a reciprocal Equivalent, was to be the Condition of every Ceſſion, made by either Party, the Reſtitution of *Belleiſle*, *Senegal*, or *Goree*, would no doubt be an Equivalent for all that *France* had then conquered. But ſuch a Peace would be ſomewhat " inconſiſtent with the loftieſt Dig-" nity on her Side, or the moſt diffident " Humility on ours." (P. 90. and 91.)

In P. 90. the Author aſks, " if *France* had been in Poſſeſſion of all *Canada*, and we Maſters only of the Fiſheries of *Newfoundland* and St. *Lawrence*; if in this Situation, we had admitted her to a Participation of theſe Fiſheries, in Exchange for *Canada*, whether any fair Arbitrator would not have conſidered it as a Bargain, extremely advantageous to *France*?" I agree with the Author, he certainly would; and the Bargain is ſtill more advantageous, as we are

" indi-

" indiſputably Maſters both of one and the " other." (P. 90.) *Canada* produces little to *France* ; and the Fiſhery is of infinite Advantage to her, without which ſhe muſt remain deprived of an Article greatly neceſſary to her Subſiſtence, and to that of her Sugar Iſlands : Nor could ſhe, without it, have the Means of becoming a Maritime Power. But for theſe very Reaſons, *France* never will ſubmit to an Excluſion, which would make a total and perpetual Diſability the Purchaſe of a preſent precarious Peace ; and under the Pretence of retaining one Part of what we have acquired, would render what we yielded of little Value ; leaving the miſerable Remains abſolutely ſubject to our Power. Perpetual War muſt be the Reſult of ſuch extravagant Projects : And how little we are prepared for ſuch an unchriſtian Meaſure, needs no farther Explanation. The *Examiner* ſeems aware of theſe Conſequences : He doth not even hint at our poſſeſſing an excluſive Fiſhery, and only contraſts it with *Canada*, to expoſe the little Value of that Acquiſition compared with a conſiderable Object. But there are many who widely differ in Opinion from him ; enough from their Weight and Number to claim the Attention of thoſe, who examine the commercial Principles

ciples upon which a Peace ought to be concluded. The Author ſhould, therefore, after eſtabliſhing the Importance of *Guadaloupe*, give ſome Reaſons for not inſiſting upon an Excluſion of *France* from the Banks of *Newfounland*, and the Gulph of St. *Lawrence*: And if he really means that ſome Sacrifices "ſhould be made to the "Peace of *Europe*;" (P. 92.) after ſecuring "the faireſt and fatteſt of our Flock," (P. 93.) from the Knife of the Sacrificer, he ſhould mark out, in his turn, ſome Victims, leſs coſtly, but ſufficient to ſave the Lives of Thouſands of the human Species, now devoted to the infernal Furies of War.

But if the comparative Value to *France* of her Sugar-Iſlands and Fiſheries were to be adjuſted by her, I am not clear, whether in *French* Eſtimation the laſt would not preponderate, even as much as the *Weſt Indies* do, in our Author's Balance, againſt *North America*. But it hath been ſhewn, that comparative Benefits ariſing to *France*, are an unſure Scale of the Intereſts of *Great Britain*: Things of leſs Value to her may be of an Importance to us, infinitely greater than others which ſhe holds at much a higher Price. Such is the Territory we have acquired

quired in *North America*, with reſpect to her Iſlands, and ſuch it may be with reſpect to an excluſive Fiſhery. One Thing is certain: The Loſs to her would be more than any poſitive Gain to us, in the laſt as well as the firſt Inſtance; and *France* and her Iſlands would be expoſed to all the Extremities of Want, rather than open their Markets to *Britiſh* Fiſhermen bringing a *Britiſh* Manufacture. Nor is this true of *France* only; *Spain* hath, ſince her Declaration of War, prohibited the Importation of Fiſh from *Newfoundland*; and the Pope hath freed her Subjects, by Indulgences, from thoſe Faſts which rendered it indiſpenſably neceſſary. How far the ſame eccleſiaſtical Policy may prevail in other Popiſh Countries (and thoſe of that Religion are our only Cuſtomers for Fiſh in *Europe*) cannot be foretold. But ſhould an Enmity to Heretic *England* prevail with the See of *Rome*, to diſpenſe with her own Injunctions; and a Jealouſy of all-graſping *England* incline other Popiſh States to avail themſelves of ſuch Diſpenſations; inſtead of acquiring more by an Attempt to poſſeſs all, we may loſe a Share, if not the whole, of what we before enjoyed.

The Mud-Fiſhery, a conſiderable Branch, hath no vent but in *France*, and hath never been carried on by any but *Frenchmen* in any degree worth Notice. This never can be ours; and thoſe who compute our additional Gains, and the increaſing Number of Fiſhermen in an excluſive Fiſhery, by adding to our own Stock all that *France* had, muſt deduct from their ſanguine Calculations this very important Item. We may, no doubt, refuſe to *France* what was granted to her by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, a Place to dry her Fiſh on: We may proſecute the War until ſhe acquieſces in a Refuſal, which would deprive her Iſlands in *America*, and her Southern Provinces in *Europe*, of a material Article of Suſtenance; and we ſee what may be the Conſequence of ſuch Policy—a perpetual War, and the Hazard of loſing all. We may go yet farther in our Demands; we may arrogate an excluſive Empire over the *Atlantic* Ocean, and forbid a *Frenchman* (although concealed in perpetual Fogs) to carry a Hook, or caſt a Line in any Part of it; we may ſtipulate what all the Navies of the World cannot enforce: But before we proceed thus far, we muſt, by a previous Article in the ſame Treaty, reſtrain the *French* from fiſhing cloſe to our Coaſts in the *Britiſh* Channel.

What

What Effect this might have on the *Dutch*, and how far it might alarm them for their Herring-Fiſhery, is a ſmall Conſideration with thoſe, who would have *Great Britain* aſſume the Port and Character of an uncontrouled Arbiter over all the Maritime Powers of *Europe*. But our Author juſtly and finely obſerves, (P. 5.) " It is only in " Time of great Proſperity, that States are " entirely Maſters of their own Conduct, " and in a Capacity of executing new " Schemes of Policy: An Error in thoſe " Schemes becomes at that Time highly " dangerous, becauſe they have then Ability " to puſh their Error as far as it will go; " and the Miſchief they bring upon them- " ſelves, is proportionable to the Strength " which they abuſe. An erroneous Policy " always precedes a declining Power." This Paſſage was well worth tranſcribing. But whether an Abuſe of Strength in Proſperity be not more likely to go too far, than to ſtop ſhort of its proper Object, is recommended to the *Examiner*'s Conſideration.

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
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